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Abstract
The advent of large password leaks in recent years has exposed the
security problems of passwords and enabled deeper empirical investi-
gation of password patterns. Researchers have only touched the sur-
face of patterns in password creation, having characterized patterns in
terms of frequency, length, composition rules and, to some extent, syn-
tactic patterns. The semantics of passwords remain largely unexplored.
In this thesis, we aim to fill this gap by employing Natural Language
Processing techniques to extract and leverage understanding of seman-
tic patterns in passwords. We present the first framework for segmenta-
tion, semantic classification and semantic generalization of passwords
and a model that captures the semantic essence of password samples.
The results of our investigation demonstrate that the knowledge cap-
tured by our model can be used to crack more passwords than the
state-of-the-art approach. In experiments limited to 3 billion guesses,
our approach can guess 67% more passwords from the LinkedIn leak
and 32% more passwords from the MySpace leak. Furthermore, we
explore the implications of using date patterns in guessing attacks and
investigate the lexical differences between standard English and the
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The exact date the password was invented is unknown. Since remote times it has
been used by people as a method of authentication, not rarely in military contexts,
such as by the Roman military [Paton et al., 2012] and in the Invasion of Normandy
by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division during World War II [Bando, 2007]. In com-
puting, it was introduced in the early 1960’s, and has become both omnipresent,
fostered by the advent of Internet, and the target of much controversy, due to its
inherent security and usability problems. Nevertheless, passwords are not likely to
be replaced in the near future, as alternative, more sophisticated forms of authen-
tication are still immature or economically infeasible, including the ones based on
“what you have” (e.g., tokens, cards, etc.) and on “who you are” (biometrics).
Moreover, passwords offer advantages not always matched by other schemes, in-
cluding usability and easy recovery from loss [Bonneau et al., 2012].
Even after half a century of use in computing, we still do not have a deep under-
standing of how passwords are created. As a consequence, there is no consensus
on the real level of security of passwords or on the adequate metric for password
strength [Bonneau, 2012]. The fact that during the past few years many security
breaches in major websites (e.g., Yahoo, Sony, LinkedIn, etc.) led to the disclosure
of passwords of millions of users, and the passwords that were hashed were quickly
cracked, has driven researchers to try to fill this lack of understanding. These lists
provide the largest samples of real-world passwords to date, offering an enormous
opportunity for empirically grounded research.
It is been increasingly acknowledged that the key to solving the security prob-
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lems of passwords lies on a better structural understanding of passwords [Jakob-
sson and Dhiman, 2013], i.e., the underlying patterns of password creation, but
the community’s knowledge is still restricted to superficial patterns. The literature
features a wealth of investigations of distribution of characters [Castelluccia et al.,
2012; Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2005] and types of mangling rules present in
passwords [Chou et al., 2013; Weir et al., 2009]. Metrics of password strength
consider mainly length, presence of non-alphabetic characters and character cas-
ing [Shay et al., 2010]; however, deeper patterns, in particular the ones concerning
the meaning of passwords, remain largely unexplored.
A search of the RockYou leak, for example, reveals interesting facts about the se-
mantics of passwords: while the most frequent passwords containing the substring
bad predominantly contain words referring to people (e.g., badboy, badgirl and
badman), the most frequent passwords containing good cooccur with a much more
diverse set of semantic categories (e.g., lifeisgood, goodluck and godisgood). This
thesis aims to address the following questions: Are there systematic preferences in
the choice of concepts? If so, what is their impact on security? For example, can an
attacker save time by targeting a specific semantic category, or targeting a specific
sequence of them? It might be also relevant to understand the relationships be-
tween semantic categories, e.g., given a password starting with the words “I love”,
is it more likely to be followed by a male or female name? Another interesting
object of study would be the occurrence of semantic patterns across populations of
different language.
Historically, the semantics of passwords have been investigated through re-
search instruments of social sciences, such as surveys, with small groups of par-
ticipants [Brown et al., 2004; Riddle et al., 1989]. Although presenting some in-
teresting findings, those studies lack ecological validity, as passwords are collected
in controlled experiments, and direct applicability against security problems, as the
evaluation is qualitative.
In this dissertation we explore the large list of passwords (over 32 million)
stolen and made publicly available in 2009 from the RockYou website1. Our first
contribution is a in-depth investigation of the date patterns in the list examined.




be used to segment, classify and generalize semantic patterns from passwords.
Our third contribution is a model that captures structural, syntactic and seman-
tic patterns of a list of passwords. We build upon previous work on Probabilistic
Context-Free Grammars to train a grammar composed of part-of-speech (POS) and
semantic nonterminal symbols. Finally, the fourth contribution consists in testing
the security impact of semantic patterns. We use our grammar to generate guesses
in off-line attack scenarios against other leaked password lists (LinkedIn and MyS-
pace). The results show that, in sessions bounded to 3 billion guesses, our model
can guess approximately 67% more LinkedIn passwords and 32% more MySpace
passwords than the state-of-the-art approach, proposed by Weir et al. [2009]. Fur-
thermore, our approach can guess ultimately 30% more MySpace passwords than
the aforementioned approach.
The thesis is structured as following: in Chapter 2 we summarize the literature
on password patterns; in Chapter 3 we present an investigation of the date patterns
in RockYou; in Chapter 4, we present an approach for segmenting passwords, clas-
sifying password segments by POS and semantic category and abstracting semantic
categories; in Chapter 5 we build a Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar based on
semantic and syntactic tags and present experimental results; finally, in Chapter 6,






Research in the field of psychology has employed qualitative research instruments
to investigate the semantics of passwords. Brown et al. [2004] found through
surveys that the most frequent entity in passwords authored by college students
is the self, followed by family, lovers and friends; also, names were found to be
the most common information used, followed by dates. Similarly, Riddle et al.
[1989] found that birth dates, personal names, nicknames and celebrity names
are common. However, eliciting the meaning of passwords from users may be a
limited method. It is unlikely that people disclose the true theme of their passwords
if it is embarrassing for them; for example, we have found that many passwords
contain sexual references and profanity. Moreover, although interesting from the
human point of view, the outcomes of these studies are not strong enough to inform
security guidelines or proactive password checking [Bishop and Klein, 1995].
Researchers in the field of computer security have recently began breaking
passwords into components and characterizing their structural patterns to develop
more empirically grounded strength metrics. In general, the recent literature about
passwords has focused on demonstrating that the traditional metrics of password
strength, such as entropy, do not provide accurate measures in the face of real-
world attacks. Several researchers have proposed methods that expose the vul-
nerability of the current password creation policies due to high-level patterns, in-
cluding lexical (i.e., word preferences), structural (i.e., preferences in composition
rules) and, to some extent, syntactic patterns (e.g., noun-verb sequences).
Weir et al. [2009] proposed a method to learn structural patterns from a pass-
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word list using probabilistic context-free grammars (PCFGs) and an algorithm to
generate guesses in highest probability order, which was able to crack 28% to
129% more passwords than John the Ripper, a popular password cracker, in sce-
narios with fixed number of guesses. Their cracking strategy has been considered
the state-of-the-art technique. The main limitation of their approach is not being
able to assign realistic probabilities to alphabetic words, nor capture their relation-
ships. Nevertheless, the PCFG framework is of general applicability to learning
password patterns, and has been applied in contexts beyond structural patterns
[Chou et al., 2013; Rao et al., 2013]. In a follow-up paper, by performing stan-
dard password cracking attacks against real passwords, the authors devised an
empirical assessment of the security provided by different creation policies and ev-
idenced the inadequacy of the notion of entropy as a metric of password strength
[Weir et al., 2010]. Bonneau [Bonneau, 2012] proposes new metrics based on
guessing resistance for password strength.
Jakobsson and Dhiman [2013] propose a parser and a model for scoring pass-
word strength. Their algorithm takes a list of decomposed passwords from the
parser and learns the component frequencies (including alphabetic strings, as op-
posed to the algorithm of Weir et al. [2009]), which are used to estimate the
probability and, thus, score the strength of a password. Their approach, however,
is still limited in capturing structural patterns, e.g., it makes no distinction between
password1 and 1password. Also, it does not account for complex relationships be-
tween classes; for example, is the sequence “Ilove” most likely to be followed by a
male or female name, a determiner or a noun?
A few publications have gone a step further, assuming that password creation
might be influenced by syntactic rules, characterized syntactic patterns and lexi-
cal dependencies. Ur et al. [2013] present a study comparing the RockYou and
Yahoo! leaks with several password lists obtained from participants in controlled
experiments exploring varied creation policies. They performed segmentation and
POS tagging of passwords and compared the distribution of POS tags between the
password and natural language, concluding that passwords are more likely than
English to contain nouns and adjectives, but less likely to contain verbs and ad-
verbs. The authors also computed statistics on the presence of bigrams from the
Google Web Corpus for each list, showing that knowing one piece of a password
6
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improves the probability of guessing the whole password. Finally, using a measure
of corpus lexical similarity, the authors suggest that RockYou and Yahoo! are rel-
atively similar. This relates to the finding of Bonneau [2012] suggesting that the
strength of Yahoo! passwords is similar to the RockYou passwords.
More substantially, Rao et al. [2013] study the effect of grammar on vulnera-
bility of long passwords and passphrases. Through a series of experiments, they
investigate the reduction in search space resulting from following English grammar,
concluding that guessing effort is not a direct function of password length, but also
the syntactic structure (how many words are used and what are their POS). Some
POS tags are more vulnerable than others since they can generate a smaller num-
ber of guesses (e.g., the search space of nouns is much larger than of pronouns).
While not discussed in their paper, it is clear that the presence of semantic patterns
could reduce even further the search space of passwords. The findings of Bon-
neau and Shutova [2012] suggest that the choice of people’s passphrases is highly
influenced by their probabilities in natural language, which has a very skewed dis-
tribution, favouring guessing attacks. In particular, they found that users strongly
prefer simple noun bigrams that are common in natural language.
The above studies, however, are limited in that they assume the vulnerabili-
ties are mainly a consequence of users choosing patterns common in natural lan-
guage, represented in reference corpora, such as the British National Corpus and
the Google Web Corpus. In this thesis, we present a model which, independent of
passwords following natural language patterns, is capable of capturing their se-
mantic and syntactic essence. In this way, we show that even if passwords do not
follow the same patterns of natural language, if one is able to learn the patterns,
they can be compromised.
In summary, the aforementioned studies inform extensively how mangling (com-
position) rules are used and their impact on security; in addition, a few studies
have suggested that syntactic patterns might reduce the security of passphrases,
and suggested the same of common passwords, which are used in the majority of
systems. These works inspired our investigation into the role that non-uniform dis-
tributions of semantic categories, and the dependencies between them, may have






The Role of Dates
Recent findings indicate that numbers appear to be commonly used in passwords
across language groups, nations, and other population groups [Bonneau, 2012].
For a cracker, a guessing attack based on number patterns is a straightforward way
to crack a significant number of passwords, as it would not require dictionaries
tailored to the target. In semantic terms, date is the most prominent concept en-
coded in numerical sequences. As we shall see in this chapter, patterns related to
the choice of dates represent a significant vulnerability.
3.1 Processing
Passwords come in a wide variety of forms. Since our main goal is to characterize
the occurrence of dates, we need to determine what will be considered as such. The
everyday use of dates is supported by some important conventions and symbols
meant to avoid ambiguity when a compact format is convenient. For example,
separators (e.g., ‘/’, ‘-’, ‘.’) are normally used to delimit the elements of a date (year,
month, and day); however, perhaps due to historical constraints in some password
systems, password creation rules, and factors such as usability, memorability, and
even portability—it is easier to re-use them as PINs—, people tend to avoid special
characters in passwords.
Not less important, the order of the elements also helps to resolve ambiguity.
Notably, the way people use ordering varies deeply across countries, and is a cause
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of confusion even within a single country, as is the case of Canada, where both
DD/MM and MM/DD formats are used. Since we do not know the country where
a password was issued, deciding between formats is challenging. Furthermore,
the presence of leading zeros is also a source of variation and ambiguity. Even
considering the separators, the date 01/02/99 can be parsed as February 1, 1999
or January 2, 1999. If we remove the separators and the leading zero (10299), the
date February 10, 1999 is also introduced as a possibility.
(1) Extract numbers (2) Blacklist (3) Matching (4) Counting
Figure 3.1: Parsing
With the aforementioned considerations, Figure 3.1 illustrates the steps of pars-
ing, which are applied to all passwords that contain a sequence of 5 to 8 digits.
Passwords containing sequences of less than 5 digits are discarded, even though a
date can be represented by 4 digits; we do this because we are only seeking dates
which are fully specified with day, month, and year. The first step is extract the
numerical sequence from the password. After that, the most common numerical
sequences are 12345, 111111, 123123, 121212 and 112233, which, intuitively,
seem not to represent dates, but “pure” numerical/keyboard patterns (see Table
3.1). In (2), we remove all sequences that match any of the numerical patterns
and some other highly frequent sequences not captured by the patterns.
Pattern Examples
Repeated digits 123123, 112233, 111222
Progression 12345, 02468, 654321
Palindrome 45754, 33633, 045540
Table 3.1: List of numerical patterns
In the next step (3), the sequences are tested against a comprehensive list of
date formats (Table 3.2). This list captures a broad range of formats of 5–8 digits
10
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without special characters, including variations in use of leading zero. A valid date
should match at least one of them and lie between the year range [1900, 2012].
8 digits 7 digits 6 digits 5 digits
ddmmyyyy ddmyyyy ddmmyy ddmyy
mmddyyyy mddyyyy mmddyy mddyy
yyyymmdd dmmyyyy dmyyyy dmmyy




Table 3.2: List of date formats.
A single password can match several formats, that might translate into different
or repeated dates (e.g., 030475 → mmddyy and mmddyy → April 3 and March 4,
1975). We considered different approaches for dealing with this ambiguity when
building the frequency distribution of dates (4). Counting all derived dates as
independent events was discarded because it would overrate ambiguous dates.
Counting just the first match based on a priority list of formats turned out to be
impractical since we don’t have solid basis on which to prioritize them. Hence,
the most reasonable strategy is to divide the count of a single event between all
matched dates. In the aforementioned case, for instance, both dates would receive
an increase of 0.5 in their frequency value.
3.1.1 Testing the Dates Assumption
We performed an experiment to rule out that the matched date sequences in the
observed data (RockYou list) could be observed by chance.
The experiment was divided in four parts, each corresponding to one of the
sequence lengths considered. For each length, we randomly generated a list con-
taining as many numerical sequences as found in the RockYou dataset. We then ran
the parsing algorithm over both samples, counting the event of a success (when a
sequence is matched by at least one format). Finally, a Pearson’s Chi-squared Test
was performed to compare the results. The proportion of sequences that contain
dates found in the random list corresponds to our expected value. The results show
11
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Subset Description # of % of RY
Passwords Passwords
(1) Passwords containing sequences of at least 4 digits 8,056,329 24.72
(2) Passwords from (1) that match a numerical pattern 1,346,410 4.13
(3) Passwords containing 5–8 consecutive digits 4,974,602 15.26
(4) Passwords from (3) that match a date 1,934,821 5.93
(5) Passwords consisting of 5–8 consecutive digits 3,951,852 12.13
(6) Passwords from (5) that match a date 1,469,662 4.51
(7) Passwords from (6) that match a numerical pattern 114,724 0.35
(8) Passwords that contain a date and at least one al-
phabetic character
358,562 1.10
Table 3.3: Table of statistics of how numbers and dates appear in the RockYou (RY)
list.
that for all considered lengths, the number of dates found in the RockYou dataset
is significantly higher than in the random dataset (p < 2.2×10−16). While this test
does not prove that numeric passwords which match date patterns are intended
to be dates, it does present intriguing evidence that the passwords may indeed
represent dates.
3.1.2 Basic Statistics
Of the 32 million passwords present in the RockYou list, approximately 25% con-
tains a sequence of 4 or more digits. Of these sequences of at least 4 digits, ap-
proximately 62% contain 5 to 8 digits (which can represent a full date consisting
of a month, day, and year).
Table 3.3 summarizes some interesting statistics on this password list. When
we match the sequences of 5–8 digits against our date patterns, we notice that
they can explain 38% of such sequences. Dates appear to be more popular in
sequences that are completely composed of digits: of the sequences that contain
a date pattern, 75% are entirely numerical digits. Of all passwords that are solely
composed of digits, 37% match date patterns (or 34% when we remove the ones
that may be due to a numerical pattern).
12














3. The Role of Dates
3.2 Visualization
To approach the problem of verifying whether dates really do play a significant
role in passwords, and if so, discovering whether there are patterns of dates, or
specific dates which stand out, we designed an interactive visualization to explore
the dataset1. We took a multiple coordinated views approach in order to provide
several ways to look at the data (see Figure 3.2). The main goals which guided our
design are:
Guide the investigation Drawing sound security recommendations from patterns
observed in a dataset eventually requires rigorous statistical treatment; how-
ever, data manipulation at a low level is cumbersome and does not favour
the exploration of data space necessary in the early stages of an investigation.
The role of the visualization in this context is to support quick generation and
early testing of hypotheses. It should enable insight on possible patterns and
provide quantitative information to help deciding whether or not a statistical
experiment is worthy. Thus, the formal procedures are left for validation in
the final phase of the investigation.
Facilitate exploration of diverse scenarios The tool should enable one to easily
delimit scenarios for investigation of localized patterns. This involves the
ability to narrow the scope based on time dimension (e.g., decades, years,
days. . . ) and password structure (e.g., presence of a numerical pattern or
letters).
Easily accessible We took a rapid-prototyping approach, refining the visualization
to respond to the questions raised by every new hypothesis drawn, reflecting
our increasing understanding of the data. As a consequence we needed a
medium that provides easy and fast deployment of new versions and high
accessibility to a distributed team.
1http://vialab.science.uoit.ca/pwdates/
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3.2.1 Representation and Interaction Design
The layout with coordinated views displays the frequency of passwords at multiple
aggregation levels (decades, years, months, and days). To provide the analyst
with confidence in our parsing algorithm, and to make use of the human ability to
see patterns, we also provide a view of the raw passwords. There are three main
components of the view. The Radial Plot shows the distribution of dates parsed
from passwords along years and decades, the Tile Map depicts the distribution
of passwords across days and months, while the raw passwords are shown in a
Wordle view. Performing filtering in a high-level view, such as the Radial Plot,
narrows the context of the lower level ones, in a top-down fashion; conversely,
removing elements from the low level views triggers updates in the high level
ones. Despite the huge amount of data, we strive for fluidity to support perception
of changes resulting from transition between states. The next subsections describe
each component.
3.2.1.1 Radial plot
This view represents years through circles positioned in a radial layout (see Figure
3.2, bottom left). All years of a certain decade are evenly distributed along a ring,
in clockwise order. The rings, representing decades, are organized in ascending
order from center to periphery. Each spoke represents years ending in a particular
digit. The frequency of passwords in a given year is encoded by color, according to
a quantile scale that maps the frequency values to the range [0,9], corresponding
to the colors of a sequential multi-hue pallette published by Brewer. This scale is
meant to reduce the negative visual effect produced by outliers, which occurs with
a linear color scale.
The radial view enables observation of cyclical patterns, while also giving us a
sense of the linear growth of frequency over the decades; furthermore, it enables
rich interaction through selection of rings, circles and labels. The most common
cyclical representation is, however, the spiral [Carlis and Konstan, 1998; Tominski,
1999]. We choose instead the ring-based configuration because it allows selection
of rings (aggregation by decade), which is an important task in this context.
The default state corresponds to the overview, where the whole dataset is
15
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shown in all views, and can be reached by clicking on a blank space in the Radial
Plot. Selecting a year by clicking it updates the Tile Map to show the correspond-
ing frequency distribution across days of that year, and the Wordle is filled with
the corresponding passwords. In the same way, it is possible to aggregate the years
by decade by selecting a ring. Cross-decade aggregation is supported by clicking
on an external label at the end of a spoke, e.g., clicking ‘2’ would select the years
1902, 1912, 1922 and so forth.
3.2.1.2 Tile Map
The Tile Map (see Figure 3.2, top) uses a calendar layout to display the frequencies
computed for each day in a particular year [Mintz and Wayland, 1997]. The color
encoding is consistent with the Radial Plot; that is, frequent regions are evidenced
by dark tiles. A click on a tile triggers an update in the Wordle, which will show
the raw passwords associated with the selected day. We extend the original use of
Tile Maps by plotting aggregated values from multiple years, much like as though
several maps were stacked. When used in this way, the calendar nature of the vi-
sualization loses its meaning, so we discard the labels informing the days of week
(Monday, Tuesday, etc.). Although simultaneous display of multiple Tile Maps in
a vertical list eases comparison between years [Wicklin and Allison, 2009], aggre-
gating them in a single unit allows better perception of patterns accumulated over
a period of time.
3.2.1.3 Word cloud
This visualization builds on the idea of a Wordle diagram, a tightly packed version
of a word cloud [Viégas et al., 2009] (Figure 3.2, bottom right). The view is pop-
ulated with raw passwords which match the selected years (Radial Plot) and day,
if any (Tile Map). The passwords are sized according to the number of times they
occur in the underlying dataset. An indicator bar is used to show the proportion of
matched passwords which are purely numerical compared to those which contain
a date-like numeric sequence as well as words and other symbols. This bar is inter-
active and can be used to restrict the view to the corresponding subset by clicking
the corresponding bar.
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In order to allow a researcher to remove any passwords which are strong out-
liers, and to see patterns in the remaining data, we provide the ability to select and
remove a password from the Wordle. The filtered word goes to a ’filtered’ panel on
the right side, then the Wordle is recomputed. When the computation is done, an
animation smoothly reorganizes the passwords.
Since it can be difficult to keep track of what has changed when a new layout
is calculated (e.g., which passwords got more or less importance after a filter is
adjusted), the duration of the transition is proportional to the frequency of the
password. So, more frequent (bigger) passwords move slower. While we have
not tested this, we feel that this appearance of the larger passwords moving more
slowly helps to give stability to the view during the relayout process.
3.2.2 Implementation
The tool is a web-based application that runs entirely in the browser, is written in
JavaScript, and built on top of a set of web technologies standardized by W3C;
namely, HTML, CSS and SVG. In addition, we use the D3 library [Bostock et al.,
2011] to manipulate data and the page’s elements, to control animation, map data
values to visual attributes and deal with events.
3.3 Semantic Patterns Discovered
When using our date visualization tool, we noticed a number of interesting patterns
in user choice (Figure 3.2). To summarize, there appears to be a preference for the
following:
• Years after 1969. The popularity of a year is indicated by the darkness of the
color in the radial portion of the visualization. See Section 3.3.1 for further
details.
• Text words that spell out the name of a month (e.g., “May12009”); see Sec-
tion 3.3.2.
• Two years immediately after one another (e.g., “20082008” or “19391945”).
17
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• The first two days in each month (e.g., “010989”).
• Repeated months/days (e.g., “August 08”).
• Holidays (e.g., Valentine’s day, Christmas day, and New Year’s day); see Sec-
tion 3.3.3.
We use each of these observations to specify patterns, which we use to compile
a dictionary used to analyse security implications (discussed in Section 3.4). We
investigate these patterns further in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Recent Years
The radial plot indicates that recent years, in particular after 1969, are the most
popular. Years in the 1980’s, followed by 1990’s and then the 2000’s appear to
be the most popular. There are still a fair number in the 1970’s and 2010’s, and
the popularity noticeably drops after 1969. We investigated this effect further and
found that 1,160,801 (86% of purely numeric date passwords) represent dates
after 1969. Some possible reasons for this preference are that the dates correspond
with: (1) the birthdays of people using these accounts, (2) the dates of significant
events for the people using these accounts, and (3) the dates that people created
these accounts.
3.3.2 Text Combined with Dates
Using the Wordle portion of the visualization, we examined the most popular text
strings that co-occur with dates. We observed that single-characters and initials ap-
pear the most frequently, and when full words are used, they are often the months
of the year. This motivated us to examine how many passwords match date pat-
terns, where the month is spelled out as opposed to being in a purely numerical
format. We generated a set of formats for such dates, for example, MonthDDYY
(see all formats in table 3.2). In all cases where the day is a single digit, we assume
no leading zero is present. Our results are shown in Table 3.4.
We found these numbers to be quite surprising, given that dates written in this
format are rather specific. Table 3.5 combines this result with the pure number
18
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Table 3.4: Passwords in the RockYou dataset that are in a mixed characters and
digits representation of a date (e.g., “1May1990”).
results that are dates, showing that, in the RockYou leak, nearly 5% of users choose
a date as their password, and nearly 4% of users choose a date on or after 1969 as
their password. As indicated in Table 3.3, the number should be even higher when
considering users who choose dates as part of their passwords.




Table 3.5: Passwords in the RockYou dataset that match a date pattern (e.g.,
“1May1990” or “01051990”). Note that dates which can also be considered a
numerical pattern (e.g., “112233”) are not included in this result.
3.3.3 Holidays
Through exploring using our visualization, we discovered that some familiar dates
“pop out”, which correlate with holidays such as Valentine’s Day, New Year’s Day,
New Year’s Eve, and Christmas Day (see Figure 3.2). While exploring the decades
individually, we also noticed a number of other noteworthy dates appearing more
frequently than expected, including:
• March 21 (First day of spring; Persian new year)
• December 12, 2012 (date associated with the “2012 cataclysm phenomenon”)
• August 17, 1945 (Indonesian Independence Day)
• April 14 and 15, 1912 (when the Titanic sank)
19
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3.4 Security Implications
Our observations using our visualization tool provide deeper understanding of user
choice relating to the semantic category of dates. It provides information regarding
how an attacker might perform an offline attack against a system in which he or she
has no knowledge of the users, their spoken languages, and the dates they might
choose (e.g., does not know the user’s birthday). Our analysis can also inform
password policies and guidelines.
3.4.1 Date-based Guessing Attacks
Here we focus on purely numeric passwords, showing the results of building a
dictionary based on each of the patterns discussed in Section 3.3. Our results are
provided in Table 3.6. Of particular interest are the bolded values in the last two
rows. In the second last row (“combined”), we see that by creating a dictionary
which combines all of our visualization-observed patterns, we would be able to
guess over 27% of date-based passwords using a dictionary composed of only ap-
proximately 15% of the possible dates. The final row shows that we can guess over
22% of date-based passwords using a dictionary composed of only approximately
7% of the possible dates.
Our findings approximate the extent to which these patterns dominate user
choices of dates. The breakdown of each individual sub-dictionary, and the com-
bined dictionary (with duplicates removed) is provided in Table 3.6.
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3. The Role of Dates
Table 3.6 shows that these patterns correctly capture approximately 27% of
date passwords, which corresponds to approximately 1% of all RockYou passwords.
We emphasize that we have eliminated our identified numerical patterns (e.g.,
“121212”) from these results, and that by combining raw numerical patterns with
this dictionary, even more passwords could be guessed; however our purpose in
the present paper is to quantify the effect of popularly-chosen dates. The results
of the combined dictionary show that we could guess nearly 1% of all RockYou
passwords in approximately 15,000 guesses defined by “popular-looking” dates.
Given that this dictionary uses only purely numerical passwords, it could model
an attack under the following threat model — when an attacker only wishes to ob-
tain access to a single account, account-lockouts are not implemented (or the at-
tack is offline), and the attacker knows nothing about the target user group (e.g.,
language, birth dates, etc.). Of course, numerical patterns appear to be more popu-
lar and would pose more of a threat, but on some systems such obvious passwords
are blacklisted.
3.4.2 Password Policies and Guidelines
We use the presented visualization to gain further understanding of how people
choose dates in passwords. The date subset appears worthy of investigation as it
is apparently a common semantic category within user choice; nearly 5% of all
user passwords in the RockYou dataset can be considered a pure date. A dictio-
nary that would be able to guess all of these pure dates would consist of approx-
imately 508,492 entries, which is feasible to guess in a short amount of time in
an offline attack. This alone creates patterns that are easy for attackers to guess,
implying that it would be prudent to recommend that users do not choose a pure
date as their password, even when it adheres to all other password rules (e.g.,
“May1/2009” would satisfy common password requirements, but likely should be
disallowed).
Our findings also strongly suggest the presence of certain patterns in user
choice of dates. These patterns tell us something about user preferences, which
provide further insight into the password selection process. For example, users
seem to prefer dates that fall on the first day of the month, or are a partial repe-
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tition. This raises a question of whether users might prefer passwords that can be
characterized by multiple patterns? It also raises the question of whether certain
numbers are more memorable than others? If either is so, this could have implica-
tions for creating better password guidelines to aid users in choosing a more secure
yet memorable password.
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After having analysed the date patterns in the subset of numerical sequences, in
this chapter we begin describing a more general approach for extraction of se-
mantic patterns in passwords. We apply NLP methods to the segmentation and
classification of password samples. With such methods, we decompose passwords
into conceptually consistent parts and infer their meaning and syntactic function.
The computer-supported semantic classification of passwords is an unprecedented
application of NLP. In this approach, passwords of all forms and lengths are broken
into parts and classified semantically; thus, segmentation is a fundamental step.
Segmentation of passwords is at least as difficult as URL segmentation, because
methods cannot rely on presence of space delimiters between words. This means
that a good method to resolve ambiguities is critical.
4.1 Segmentation
Extensive research has been done to address the problems of segmentation of texts
written in Asian languages, whose writing systems do not feature a white space
delimiter and URL word breaking. Passwords are similar to URLs in that both
are fairly multilingual and can include numbers and special characters (passwords
allow more variation). URLs, however, have much more context information avail-
able, i.e., the documents they point to, including body text, title and other meta-
data. The methods for URL word breaking documented in literature have varying
25






Table 4.1: Reference corpora detailed.
degrees of similarity with our method. Heuristic-based approaches have proposed
the resolution of ambiguities in URL segmentation by looking at document con-
tents [Chi et al., 1999] or scoring classes of word differently (e.g., stop words and
known lexicon) [Khaitan et al., 2009]. Other heuristics take into consideration
word length. Lexicon based, monolingual approaches using N-grams are also pop-
ular, as statistical methods are deemed as more robust given the wealth of data
available [Monz and Rijke, 2002]. Other approaches employ Bayesian frameworks
[Goldwater et al., 2006].
The first application of word breaking in passwords appeared not until recently,
by Jakobsson and Dhiman [2013], who proposes a lexicon-based parser. Like in
our method, their algorithm takes a compilation of general and specialized dictio-
naries as input and uses a measure of coverage as primary criterion for selection
of candidate segmentations. However, it does not make use of context (high order
N-gram frequencies) to disambiguate segmentations with equal coverage.
4.1.1 Dictionaries
Our algorithm takes as input a variety of English corpora. We make a distinc-
tion between source corpora and reference corpora. Source corpora consists of a
collection of raw word lists that constitute the algorithm’s lexicon; it is the base
for building the segmentation candidates. The reference corpora is a collection of
part-of-speech tagged N-grams with frequency of use information, which are used
for selecting the most probable segmentation (Table 4.1). As we later explain, not
all words from the source corpora need to appear in the reference corpora; i.e.,
not all words need to have an associated frequency. This frees us to compile very
comprehensive source corpora. Still, while noise in the source corpora is not a
26
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Word list Original Size Trimmed Size
COCA 365,748 359,226
Female names 51,929 51,929






Table 4.2: Source corpora detailed.
threat to the quality of the segmentation—our algorithm will always prefer the
most probable candidates—, it impacts on the performance of parsing, since more
candidates will be generated and evaluated; therefore, trimming of the word lists
is convenient.
The main corpus is the Contemporary Corpus of American English, a large,
general-purpose corpus containing part-of-speech tagged unigrams, bigrams and
trigrams along with the observed frequencies of occurrence in general language
(books, magazines, blogs, speeches, etc.)[Davies, 2008-]. COCA is used as our
reference corpus and a trimmed version is used as part of the source corpora. In
that version, of the words with three characters, the ones with less than 100 occur-
rences were removed; of the words with two characters, we selected the top 37, as
the less frequent words were mostly acronyms; and the only one-character words
kept were a and I. Those subjective thresholds values are the result of observation
of the dataset. The goal is to reduce the number of short, rare words, such as some
acronyms, that would slow down the parsing without improving accuracy.
The general nature of COCA is insufficient to support semantic classification of
named entities at a later step, especially regarding names and locations. For this
purpose, we use a collection of specialized word lists, whose size is presented in
Table 4.2:
Names Derived from a dataset of the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA)
[SSA]. All names are from Social Security card applications for births that
occurred in the United States after 1879 until February 2012. We further
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divided this list by gender.
Cities Derived from the Geonames [GeoNames] list of cities which have at least
15,000 inhabitants or are capitals. In order to reduce noise, we removed
cities whose name contains four characters and population lower than 240,000
(few notorious cities can be found below this threshold), or fewer than four
characters.
Surnames As with many popular word lists on the web, the actual source of the
list of surnames is unknown. This list was downloaded from Outpost9 [Out-
post9] and had the words with fewer than four characters removed.
Months List of months in english.
Countries List with names of all countries in English.
4.1.2 Algorithm
As previously mentioned, word boundaries are not explicit in passwords. Indeed,
due to lack of context, it is impossible to determine the exact words, if any, in-
tended by the password’s author. This is worsened by the usual intention to make
passwords more cryptic, realized in the form of a variety of mangling patterns.
Mangling patterns (or rules) are used to generate complex variations of a simple
password, e.g., love, l0v3, 3v0l, etc. According to Jakobsson and Dhiman [2013],
the most common rules are concatenation, replacement, spelling mistake and in-
sertion. Because mangling rules are a popular creation strategy, any segmentation
algorithm tailored to passwords needs to account for mangling. From a security
perspective, it is also important to preserve and later classify such patterns.
Example 1. crazy2duck93ˆ −→ gaps: {2, 93ˆ}; words: {crazy, duck}
Let’s assume a password is a sequence of word and/or gap segments. A word
segment is any string that can be found in the source corpora, while a gap segment
is any string not present in the source corpora surrounded by word segments or
password boundaries at any side. Given the constitution of our source corpora, a
28
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Password Segments Coverage
Anyonebarks98 (A) Anyone barks 98 0.84
(B) Any one barks 98 0.84
(C) Anyone bar ks98 0.69
(D) Any one bar ks98 0.69
Table 4.3: Candidate segmentation for password Anyonebarks98
word segment is always alphabetic, while a gap can include any character (num-
bers, symbols or letters). Example 1 illustrates the segmentation of a password
containing both types of segments.
In Example 1 there is not much room for ambiguity. In Table 4.3, instead, we
have at least four competing candidate segmentations. If we favour coverage by
word segments, i.e., minimum presence of gaps, we can rule out the candidates C
and D. The two remaining candidates have equal coverage; thus another criterion
is considered as a secondary disambiguation factor: frequency of use. In the English
language, the construct (A) is more probable than (B).
The segmentation strategy illustrated in Table 4.3 is described at high level in
Algorithm 1. Given a password p, we generate a set W containing all substrings
of p; then after a filter, W contains only the strings present in the source corpora
(word segments). Next, a list of segmentation candidates is built, each containing
a subset of W . The segmentation candidates are only formed by word segments.
The list is then filtered to contain only the ones with greatest coverage (sum of
length of segments). In the frequent case that more than one candidate remains,
we assign an n-gram probability to each candidate and select the best (t). As a last
step, the gap segments are re-inserted in t in the appropriate positions.
The selection of the most probable segmentation candidate is based on the
reference corpora. As previously stated, it contains high order N-gram frequencies
that can help us rank the segmentations by likelihood. Let KN be an N-gram corpus
and f (KN) the total frequency of N-grams in corpus K . The probability of an N-
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Algorithm 1 Segment string into most probable word and gap sequence
1: procedure SEGMENT(p)
2: W ← Generate all possible substrings of p
3: Remove w ∈W not present in source corpora
4: C ← Generate segmentation candidates from W
5: θ ← Calculate maximum coverage from C
6: Remove c ∈ C | c < θ
7:
8: if LENGTH(C)> 1 then
9: t ← Select most probable c ∈ C
10: else
11: t ← C[0]
12: end if
13: Insert gaps in t
14: return t
15: end procedure
An annotated trigram corpus can serve as the grounds for very accurate seg-
mentation, but its coverage is usually limited. The higher the N-gram order, the
greater the chances of a context not be found in the corpus. There is a clear trade-
off between accuracy and coverage and one way to work around it is falling back
to less accurate algorithms whenever necessary. We rely on this backoff strategy in
the recursive Algorithm 2 to generate probabilities used in line 9 of Algorithm 1.
The probability of a segmentation is the product of its N-gram probabilities. Given
a segmentation containing three segments, for example, the algorithm computes
all combinations of trigram, bigram and unigram probabilities and chooses the one
that maximizes the score.
In language modelling, N-gram models are often evaluated in the context of
a classic task, where the problem is to predict the next word given the previous.
We did not test the accuracy of our model in this traditional framework, as we are
only interested in ranking the candidates; in other words, we do not need a precise
measure of how much better a candidate is in comparison to another. Table 4.4
shows a sample of the segmentation results produced by the algorithm.
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Table 4.4: Random sample
of segmentation results.
Source Relative
Rank Word corpus Count Freq. (%)
1 a coca 1361806 3.24
2 i coca 1263919 3.01
3 love coca 584219 1.39
4 me coca 263629 0.63
5 in coca 220521 0.53
6 you coca 206937 0.49
7 baby coca 204716 0.49
8 my coca 186373 0.44
9 to coca 166795 0.40
10 an coca 159914 0.38
11 is coca 151409 0.36
12 girl coca 142228 0.34
13 it coca 140943 0.34
14 as coca 119110 0.28
15 la fem. name 117583 0.28
16 te fem. name 112123 0.27
17 sexy coca 109663 0.26
18 on coca 107114 0.26
19 am coca 105293 0.25
20 be coca 100167 0.24
21 man coca 99677 0.24
22 password coca 99296 0.24
23 the coca 98293 0.23
24 luv coca 98250 0.23
25 boy coca 92671 0.22
26 no coca 92572 0.22
27 amo fem. name 89068 0.21
28 rock coca 88746 0.21
29 angel coca 86063 0.20
30 ca coca 85751 0.20
31 or coca 82794 0.20
32 na fem. name 82108 0.20
33 el male name 80608 0.19
34 and coca 78502 0.19
35 lil coca 74801 0.18
36 do coca 71859 0.17
37 ha fem. name 71467 0.17
38 de male name 69206 0.16
39 princess coca 69178 0.16
40 life coca 66054 0.16
41 lo male name 63621 0.15
42 he coca 62692 0.15
43 ma fem. name 61648 0.15
44 ko male name 60691 0.14
45 at coca 60528 0.14
46 ta fem. name 60193 0.14
47 fuck coca 59928 0.14
48 hot coca 58486 0.14
49 yo fem. name 58064 0.14
50 pink coca 57130 0.14
Table 4.5: 50 most frequent words from the source
corpora in the RockYou list.
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Algorithm 2 Recursively calculate the N-gram score of a segmentation
1: procedure BESTNGRAMSCORE(C)
2: score← 0
3: l ← LENGTH(C)
4:
5: if l = 1 then
6: score← UNIGRAMPROBABILITY(C)
7: else if l = 2 then
8: score← BIGRAMPROBABILITY(C)




13: if score = 0 then
14: for i← 1, 3 do
15: a← BESTNGRAMSCORE(C[: i])
16: b← BESTNGRAMSCORE(C[i :])
17: tempScore← a ∗ b






4.1.3 Analysis of Segmentation Results
Now that we have the capability of extracting words from passwords, the simplest
analytical question one can make is which words are more common in the RockYou
list? This question is of relevance to password cracking, in particular, one of the
weaknesses of the the approach of Weir et al. [2009] is the lack of a sound method
to assign probabilities to the words their guess generator takes as input. In that
case, a ranked dictionary can be used to form guesses in highest probability order.
Table 4.5 shows the 50 top segments in the RockYou list.
Another relevant question is how the vocabulary of passwords compares to
the language of real world? To answer this question, we use the British National
Corpus (BNC) [BNC, 2007] as a reference and the measure of corpus similarity G2
for ranking the most distinguishing words [Rayson and Garside, 2000]. The G2
32
4. Parsing and Classification
measure is calculated using the following contingency tables and equations:
Corpus A Corpus B Total
C(word) a b a+ b
C(other words) c− a d − b c+ d − a− b
Total c d c + d
E1 = c ∗ (a+ b)/(c+ d) (4.2)
E2 = d ∗ (a+ b)/(c+ d) (4.3)
G2 = 2 ∗ (a ∗ ln(a/E1) + b ∗ ln(b/E2)) (4.4)
where C(word) in the count of the target word and E1 and E2 are the expecta-
tion values for the word frequency in corpus A and B, respectively. In summary, G2
tells us the probability that the frequency of occurrence of a word in one corpus dif-
fers significantly from another. Table 4.6 shows the most deviant words between
passwords and BNC. A positive G2 value indicates the word is more common in
passwords, while a negative value indicates the contrary.
The results reveal that the probability of connective words, in particular, prepo-
sitions (from, in, with, to, etc.) and conjunctions (and, for, but, etc.) is much
higher in the BNC corpus than in the RockYou passwords. The most reasonable ex-
planation is the size of the sentences, as BNC frequencies are extracted from a large
collection of books, newspapers, magazines, and so forth. Surprisingly, a subset of
pronouns (I, me and my) are much more likely to appear in passwords, contrary to
others, for example, her, him, and they. Other words stand out in passwords with
no obvious linguistic explanation, such as love, baby, sexy and princess. Therefore,
we hypothesize that, instead of syntactic patterns, semantics should explain the
high occurrence of such words and the disparity of frequencies of words with same
syntactic function.
4.1.4 Visual Exploration
We designed a web-based visualization tool to enable visual exploration of the lexi-
cal difference between BNC and passwords (Figure 4.1). The visualization features
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G2 Ranking Word G2 BNC Freq. (%) Pass. Freq. (%)
Negative
1 the -3562992.1 6.18 0.23
2 of -1710019.2 2.94 0.10
3 and -1357509.7 2.68 0.19
4 to -945327.8 2.56 0.40
5 that -726880.0 1.11 0.01
6 was -573790.3 0.92 0.02
7 ’s -529691.4 0.81 0.01
8 for -482500.2 0.85 0.04
9 in -445348.4 1.88 0.53
10 with -425616.0 0.65 0.01
11 have -303984.0 0.47 0.01
12 they -296823.3 0.43 0.00
13 from -273829.2 0.41 0.00
14 but -271616.7 0.46 0.01
15 this -270287.3 0.46 0.02
16 had -266129.0 0.44 0.01
17 which -259366.4 0.37 0.00
18 his -257657.5 0.43 0.01
19 not -237838.7 0.46 0.03
20 it -231153.4 1.09 0.34
Positive
1 love 1241949.6 0.02 1.39
2 i 767866.4 0.90 3.01
3 baby 430337.4 0.01 0.49
4 te 269387.4 0.00 0.27
5 sexy 259820.1 0.00 0.26
6 girl 255209.0 0.02 0.34
7 la 249772.7 0.00 0.28
8 luv 237913.5 0.00 0.23
9 password 237306.2 0.00 0.24
10 me 221084.4 0.14 0.63
11 amo 216783.0 0.00 0.21
12 angel 195553.4 0.00 0.20
13 el 183410.1 0.00 0.19
14 lil 179966.7 0.00 0.18
15 rock 172164.9 0.01 0.21
16 boy 155204.1 0.01 0.22
17 lo 150611.6 0.00 0.15
18 ha 147753.1 0.00 0.17
19 ko 147109.6 0.00 0.14
20 princess 146047.7 0.00 0.16
Table 4.6: G2 Top ranked positive and negative words.
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the 500 most distinguishing words (ranked by |G2|) and allows one to interactively
compare measures of word frequency and check the most frequent passwords that
contain a certain word. The words are represented by polylines in a parallel coordi-
nates plot [Inselberg, 1985], with polyline color encoding the sign of the G2 value
(blue as positive and brown as negative). Low-level tasks like selection, brushing,
search, and axis inversion and axis reordering are all supported. In order to mini-
mize the visual effect of outliers and leverage the screen space, the scale of the axes
is not linear, but quantile; this is evidenced by the axis labels distributed unevenly
along the axes.
In Figure 4.1, we compare the words the and angel. Their position in the G2
axis reveals that the is much more likely to appear in English language than in pass-
words, as opposed to angel. While both have a similar frequency in passwords, the
G2 measure distinguishes “angel” as being much more frequent in passwords than
expected. On the left pane, one can see the most frequent passwords containing
the word angel.
The visualization offered important support for validation of the segmentation
results, as it provides quick access to the passwords linked to a word. A known
weakness of our segmentation algorithm is the production of noise from passwords
that do not contain words (e.g., I and a would be parsed from a123i321k), in
particular when a comprehensive source corpora is used (e.g., the Asian name ho
would be parsed from a seemingly random password like ts63k7ho). Those issues
were easily spotted using the visualization.
4.1.5 Limitations
Our parser is not multilingual. While there are some foreign words in the source
corpora, the occurrence of unknown foreign words causes errors in the segmen-
tation. This affects the accuracy of the syntactic and semantic classifications. If
one intends to use our approach in contexts that require high accuracy—study of
semantics in passwords from the cultural perspective, for example—, it would also
be desirable to improve our named entity disambiguation, which is somewhat ar-
bitrary. Another limitation of our parser is that if new terms begin to be used in
passwords (e.g., new company names or slang), they will only be captured once
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Table 4.7: Taggers that compose the backoff model, in order of priority. The cover-
age column shows the percentage of word segments from the RockYou list tagged
by each tagger.
included as part of the source corpora. One could address this problem by using
culturally based dynamic dictionaries, such as the ones derived from Wikipedia or
Twitter (i.e., hashtag trends).
4.2 Part-of-speech tagging
Part-of-speech tagging is a required step for the semantic classification we perform
on nouns and verbs. Beyond that, for security purposes, it is very important to
tag words that belong to all other POS classes, because it can potentially lead to
further reduction of the search space in cracking attacks. POS tagging benefits
from contextual information much like segmentation but, fortunately, there is a
wealth of free tools that implement sound POS tagging algorithms which produce
reasonable results. In particular, the POS module of the Natural Language Toolkit
(NLTK) [Bird, 2006] was used, trained on our data. For each password, the POS
function takes as input and array [s1, ..., sn], where si is a segment, and outputs and
array of 2-tuples [(s1, t1), ..., (sn, t1)], where t i is a POS tag.
4.2.1 Sequential Backoff Tagger
We rely again on backoff models, since one can be trained easily in NLTK and it has
a good balance between simplicity and accuracy [Manning and Schütze, 1999]. In
Table 4.7, we show the taggers that compose the backoff model in order of priority.
We first try to tag the segments using the COCA trigram tagger (NLTK trigram
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model trained with the COCA trigrams); if it fails, the COCA bigram tagger is used,
and so forth. The tagger is used to tag only the word segments of passwords. The
names tagger tags anything seen in the names source corpus as NP (proper name),
while the WordNet tagger searches for a word in the WordNet tree and chooses the
POS tag corresponding to the most common sense of the word. Finally, the default
tagger is a custom tagger which arbitrarily tags any word as NN (noun). A default
tagger is used to assign the most common tag to words that could not be tagged by
any other tagger, so that the backoff tagger has full coverage [Bird et al., 2009].
The unigram tagger, as expected, is the one that tags the majority of words.
4.2.2 Results
The algorithm does a good job in disambiguating the word using the context pro-
vided, as in the passwords gangsterlove and ilovestacy where the word love assumes
different syntactic functions. The Table 4.8 shows the resulting distribution of seg-









Table 4.8: Distribution of the POS tagged segments from RockYou by syntactic
category.
4.3 Semantic Classification
After segmenting and POS tagging the passwords, we finally meet the requirements
to perform a good semantic classification. At this point, we can represent each
password by an array of 2-tuples S = [(s1, t1), ..., (sn, tn)], where si is a segment and
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Table 4.9: Sample results of the POS tagging.
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t i is a POS tag (Null for gap segments). In this section, we describe an algorithm
that takes as input an array of passwords in the format S and outputs for each
password an array K = [(s1, t1, c1), ..., (sn, tn, cn)], where ci is a semantic category.
First, we show how WordNet and the source corpora can be used to assign semantic
tags to segments (Section 4.3.1). After, in Section 4.3.2, we describe how low-level
semantic concepts can be abstracted, allowing us to, later on, characterize semantic
patterns in a more general way.
4.3.1 WordNet-based classification
WordNet 3.0 [Fellbaum, 2010] is a large, manually constructed, lexical database of
English structured as a network (or graph) of concepts. Each concept is expressed
as a synset, a set of synonyms. WordNet covers adjectives, verbs, nouns and ad-
verbs, separately. Concepts are connected through hyperonymy (IS-A) relations1;
i.e., synsets are arranged into hierarchies, where the top nodes express general
concepts and towards the bottom the nodes are increasingly specific. WordNet can
be used to group words that share a meaning into a semantic category. For exam-
ple, the words car, auto, automobile and motorcar all refer to the concept car, and
car IS-A vehicle. In the WordNet terminology the words are called lemmas and the
concept is called a synset.
In our semantic classification of password segments, verbs and nouns are the
only classes that receive a semantic tag. Adjectives in WordNet are not connected
through hyperonymy relations, but through other relations, such as antonymy, that
do not contribute to generalization (see Section 4.3.2). In fact, sentiment analysis
would be a suitable way to generalize adjectives, but it is out of scope in this
dissertation. All other syntactic classes (e.g., pronouns, adverbs, etc.) are not
semantically classified because of their limited semantic content—POS suffices as
a categorization criterion.
In Algorithm 3, we detail the steps of semantic classification. If s is a gap
segment, it is classified according to the Table 4.10, using regular expressions.
Next, we test if s is a proper noun. WordNet does not provide comprehensive
1There are several other semantic relations (e.g., antonymy, meronymy, holonymy), some of
them featured in WordNet; however, we are only interested in hyperonymy, since it contributes to
generalization. See section 4.3.2.
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Table 4.10: Semantic categories of gap segments.
support to proper nouns (NP tags), which account for 55% of the segments from
RockYou that are tagged as nouns; thus, if the word is a proper noun, we rely on the
source corpora to tag it as month, female name, male name, surname, country or
city, in this order. This is necessary because the corpora is ambiguous, e.g., Paris is
both in the cities and in the female names word lists, so we disambiguate this step
by arbitrarily prioritizing the word list. Next, if the word is either a verb or a noun,
we reduce it to its stem (stemming) and find its synsets in WordNet. A word might
have different associated synsets (one for each sense), which are ordered according
to their frequency count, from most to least frequently used [Fellbaum, 1998].
However, according to the WordNet documentation, frequency information was
last updated in 2001 and is no longer maintained; so the sense ordering should not
be construed as an accurate indicator of frequency of use. As we do not need very
accurate sense disambiguation, we choose the first synset, whose name becomes
the semantic tag of the word. The name has the form word.pos.#, where # is
the sense number; for example, love.n.01 is the first noun sense of “love”. Table
4.11 shows the synsets chosen for nouns and verbs extracted from a sample of the
RockYou passwords.
4.3.2 Generalization
We saw in the previous section that our WordNet-based semantic classification
groups words with same meaning into synsets; however, it does not consider the
hyperonymy relations between synsets. For example, the words dolphin and butter-
fly would not be grouped under the animal synset, even though they are hyponyms
of animal. The ability to generalize semantic categories is desirable, given that we
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Algorithm 3 Classify segments by semantic category
1: procedure CLASSIFYSEMANTIC(S)
2: K ← []
3: for all (s, t) ∈ S do
4: c← null
5: if s is a gap segment then
6: classify by gap category
7: else if t is a proper noun tag then
8: c← source corpus name
9: else if t is either a verb or a noun tag then
10: s← STEM(s)
11: s ynsets← LOOKUPWORDNET(s)
12: if LENGTH(s ynsets)> 0 then
13: c← s ynsets[0].name
14: end if
15: end if




could characterize patterns in a more general, concise way; for example, if sev-
eral kinds of animal appear with consistent frequency in the sample, we could
abstract and tag them all as animal. Nonetheless, each synset is linked to a chain
of hypernyms, and selecting the appropriate hypernym automatically is difficult.
Consider the synset dove.n.01, whose six first hypernyms are pigeon.n.01, columb-
iform_bird.n.01, gallinaceous_bird.n.01, bird.n.01, chordate.n.01 and animal.n.01.
Which synset is more appropriate to represent dove.n.01 at a higher level? A naive
solution would consist in choosing a certain level of abstraction based on obser-
vation of the WordNet tree; however, the WordNet tree is highly uneven, to the
extent that while a level of abstraction might be appropriate for a certain subtree,
it will likely be too general or specific for other. This can be noticed in Figure 4.2,
which portrays through a treemap plot the highest level WordNet verb synsets with
size proportional to frequency in the RockYou passwords. A gray square represents
an internal node, while a beige square represents a leaf node. In the figure, some
abstract synsets (e.g., change.v.01 and travel.v.01) have somewhat balanced fre-
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quency amongst its children; thus, generalization would be reasonable, as it would
provide gain in conciseness with not much loss in accuracy. Other abstract synsets
(e.g., connect.v.01 and miss.v.01) have words mostly concentrated in one or few
children, making the cost of generalization higher; that is, high loss of accuracy
with low gain in conciseness. Ideally, we need to define an uneven horizontal cut
in the WordNet tree establishing a flexible level of generalization.
To automatically find that cut, we make use of the tree cut model by Li and Abe
[1998]. Given a sample S, where each data item s is an occurrence of a synset
in passwords and a hierarchy (tree) of categories abstracting the synsets, the tree
cut model selects the tree cut that represents the best generalization level for the
sample. Each internal node of the tree represents a semantic category, and each
leaf node represents an instance of the classes above. The frequency of the leaves
correspond to the observed frequencies in the samples, and are accumulated by the
internal nodes. The tree cut model defines a horizontal cut M across the tree, so
that the nodes belonging to the cut abstract all nodes underneath; in other words,
a tree cut defines an uneven generalization level for the tree.
The tree cut model is based on the Minimum Description Length Principle, with
roots in Information Theory. The principle basically states “that any regularity in a
given set of data can be used to compress the data, i.e., to describe it using fewer
symbols than needed to describe the data literally” [Grünwald et al., 2005]. Thus,
with a good estimation of the probabilities that underlie the occurrence of data
items, it is possible to efficiently encode the sample.
Roughly, the tree cut model selects the cut that has the best balance between
two metrics: Lpar(M) (parameter description length) and Ldat(M) (data descrip-
tion length), which are involved in a trade-off. Ldat(M), which measures how far
the tree cut model M is from the data, is proportional to the abstraction level—
the greater the abstraction level, the lesser the model fits the data. Lpar(M), on
the other hand, represents the size of the cut and is inversely proportional to the
abstraction level. Ideally, we want a small Lpar(M) (good level of generalization)
but with a good fit to the data (small Ldat(M)). Technically, the algorithm of Li
and Abe [1998] minimizes the sum of Lpar(M) and Ldat(M), referred to as model
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4. Parsing and Classification
description length Lmod(M):
Lmod(M) = Lpar(M) + Ldat(M) (4.5)
The parameter description length is calculated as in Equation 4.6, where k is










where s ∈ S is the occurrence of a synset in the sample and P̂(s) represents the










where f (C) is the total frequency of instances of class C in the sample.
4.3.2.1 Adapting the tree cut model to WordNet
The tree cut model was developed for a thesaurus tree; however, WordNet is a
directed acyclic graph, so we need to convert it to a tree to get a correct model.
Furthermore, the internal nodes in WordNet represent simultaneously semantic
categories and word senses, while the tree cut model assumes that internal nodes
are categories and leaves are senses. Therefore, the following steps are performed
to convert WordNet to a suitable representation [Wagner, 2000]:
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[use.v.01, work.v.12, exercise.v.03, warm_up.v.04]
2. Divide frequency count between duplicated (ambiguous) synsets.
3. Split internal nodes into word sense and semantic classes by creating a child
leaf node that represents the sense. For example:
[use.v.01, work.v.12, warm_up.v.04]
becomes [use.v.01, work.v.12, warm_up.v.04, s.warm_up.v.04]
In addition, Wagner [2000] reports that the algorithm of Li and Abe [1998]
“tends to over-generalize for infrequent verbs and to under-generalize for frequent
verbs”. Wagner noticed that Lpar and Ldat have different complexities with respect
to the sample size |S|. Lpar has the complexity O(log|S|), while Ldat has the com-
plexity O(|S|), as seen in Equations 4.7 and 4.6. That means that, in our case, the
size of the sample has influence over the level of generalization; so as the sample
gets larger the algorithm tends to under-generalize—a fact that has been observed
in our experiments. Wagner [2000] then proposes a weighting factor, which is
essentially a free parameter that introduces some flexibility in the calculation re-
garding the level of generalization. This parameter, hereby called W , is introduced






Ldat(M) (C > 0) (4.10)
The value of the parameter W , however, is chosen arbitrarily; so in order to
evaluate the choice of this parameter, we prototyped an interactive visualization
that allows the comparison of tree cuts resulting from different W values. In Figure
4.3, the visualization shows a representation of the subtree rooted at the node
carnivore.n.01, where frequency is cumulative and encoded by color (the higher
the value, the darker the node). The golden line represents the tree cut resulting
from using W = 1,000, while the red line corresponds to W = 5,000 and the blue
line to W = 10, 000.
Roughly, the tree cut model only generalizes groups of synsets whose frequen-
cies are, to some extent, uniform, and this extent can be adjusted by the W param-
eter, as discussed previously. It is evident in the visualization that smaller W values
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lead to more general cuts. For example, with W = 1, 000 all types of wild cats are
represented by the concept wildcat.n.01, which crosses the golden cut; however,
the disparity between the frequencies of wildcat.n.01 and its siblings prevents the
generalization to cat.n.01. On the other hand, at W = 5,000, the algorithm pre-
serves the distinction between all kinds of wild cats, and at W = 10,000, the level
of specificity is raised, with the cut discriminating types of lynx, such as bobcat.
This behaviour matches closely the human intuition. Entities that occur uni-
formly tend to be generalized, while deviating entities are treated individually.
From an analytical point of view, the generalization helps to shed light upon highly
occurring concepts. For example, the fact that none of the cuts crosses dog.n.01
reveals that in passwords there might be preferences towards certain types of dog,
such as bulldog. After examining several parts of the whole tree, we concluded
that the value W = 5, 000 leads to a generalization level that significantly reduces
the complexity of the classification (i.e., number of categories), while highlighting
highly divergent categories.
4.3.3 Resulting Semantic Categories
In Table 4.11, we show a sample of the results of the semantic classification. The
Semantic tag column shows the semantic tags assigned to the password segments
after generalization (described in the previous section). The effect of generaliza-
tion can be observed by comparison of the semantic tags with the corresponding
synsets. For example, in the password 671soldier, the segment soldier is classified
as worker.n.01, a generalization of the synset soldier.n.01. Notably, some synsets
are not generalized (e.g., puppy.n.01).
We also show the top 100 semantic categories in Table 4.12, the contents of
which reveal some interesting insights about the semantics of passwords. Cate-
gories reported by surveys appear (e.g., names and dates), but also new categories
appear such as love (lines 6 and 7), places (lines 3 and 13), sexual terms (lines 29,
34, 54, and 69), royalty (lines 25, 59, 60), profanity (line 40, 70, and 72), animals
(lines 33, 36, 37, 92, 96, and 100), food (61, 66, 76, 82, and 93), alcohol (line
39), and money (line 46 and 74). Some categories, noted with +, contain within
them some noise caused by the parsing of two-letter words that occur in our com-
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4. Parsing and Classification
Password Segment POS Semantic Tag Synset
hope87 hope VB wish.v.01 hope.v.01
hope87 87 number
serenity serenity NN trait.n.01 repose.n.03
bishop5 bishop NN status.n.01 bishop.n.01
bishop5 5 number
slutsister slut NN vulgarian.n.01 slattern.n.02
slutsister sister NN s.sister.n.01 sister.n.01
fuckyou05 fuck VB s.sleep_together.v.01 sleep_together.v.01
fuckyou05 you PPO
fuckyou05 05 number
goblue0507 go VB s.travel.v.01 travel.v.01
goblue0507 blue NN
goblue0507 507 number
looted looted VBN take.v.21 loot.v.01
drift21 drift NN force.n.02 drift.n.01
drift21 21 number
candysinger candy NN s.candy.n.01 candy.n.01
candysinger singer NN musician.n.01 singer.n.01
671soldier 671 number
671soldier soldier NN worker.n.01 soldier.n.01
bravo100 bravo NN murderer.n.01 assassin.n.01
bravo100 100 number
egobrain ego NN pride.n.01 ego.n.01
egobrain brain NN structure.n.04 brain.n.01
pitcher9 pitcher NN athlete.n.01 pitcher.n.01
pitcher9 9 number
puppies puppies NNS puppy.n.01 puppy.n.01
church church NN religion.n.02 church.n.01
‘ale‘8 ‘ special
‘ale‘8 ale NN alcohol.n.01 ale.n.01
‘ale‘8 ‘8 num+special
‘18angelnjohany ‘18 num+special
‘18angelnjohany angel NN s.angel.n.01 angel.n.01
‘18angelnjohany n char
‘18angelnjohany johany NP mname
Table 4.11: Sample of passwords with segments classified by semantics. The Se-
mantic tag column shows the final semantic category of a segment, after synset
generalization.
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Category % Freq Category % Freq
+1 mname 20.609 *51 junior.n.04 0.099
+2 fname 16.697 *52 multiple_sclerosis.n.01 0.098
3 city 3.283 53 collection.n.01 0.098
+4 surname 1.214 54 s.sexual_activity.n.01 0.097
5 s.be.v.01 1.131 55 s.day.n.01 0.097
6 s.love.v.01 0.930 *56 megahertz.n.01 0.093
7 s.love.n.01 0.917 57 s.car.n.01 0.092
8 s.baby.n.01 0.707 *58 s.ad.n.01 0.089
9 month 0.572 59 s.lady.n.01 0.087
10 s.girl.n.01 0.467 60 s.king.n.01 0.086
11 structure.n.01 0.350 61 honey.n.01 0.085
*12 tellurium.n.01 0.345 62 inhabitant.n.01 0.082
13 country 0.341 *63 disk_jockey.n.01 0.082
14 s.rock.n.01 0.336 64 s.hood.n.01 0.080
15 s.male_child.n.01 0.334 65 group_action.n.01 0.079
16 s.angel.n.01 0.311 66 s.pie.n.01 0.074
17 s.man.n.01 0.306 *67 titanium.n.01 0.074
18 password.n.01 0.305 *68 actinium.n.01 0.073
*19 ma.n.01 0.297 69 s.kiss.n.01 0.072
20 woody_plant.n.01 0.290 70 buttocks.n.01 0.071
21 worker.n.01 0.275 71 s.friend.n.01 0.071
22 s.make.v.01 0.221 72 crap.n.01 0.070
23 commodity.n.01 0.214 73 s.miss.v.01 0.070
*24 dad.n.01 0.214 74 s.money.n.01 0.069
25 s.princess.n.01 0.213 75 traveler.n.01 0.068
*26 chemical.n.01 0.206 76 starches.n.01 0.067
27 s.life.n.01 0.203 77 s.ball.n.01 0.064
*28 s.knockout.n.02 0.187 78 s.sunlight.n.01 0.063
29 s.sleep_together.v.01 0.184 *79 gilbert.n.01 0.063
30 s.travel.v.01 0.175 80 fellow.n.06 0.063
*31 ka.n.01 0.171 81 s.get.v.01 0.062
32 s.star.n.01 0.169 82 cocoa.n.01 0.062
33 s.dog.n.01 0.166 83 s.rise.v.01 0.061
34 s.lover.n.01 0.154 84 craft.n.02 0.061
35 herb.n.01 0.145 85 s.monday.n.01 0.060
36 s.cat.n.01 0.135 86 s.family.n.01 0.060
37 s.monkey.n.01 0.133 87 s.hate.v.01 0.060
*38 district_attorney.n.01 0.131 *88 bachelor_of_arts.n.01 0.060
39 alcohol.n.01 0.125 89 s.football.n.01 0.060
40 bitch.n.01 0.122 90 s.manner.n.01 0.060
*41 qi.n.01 0.121 91 s.state.v.01 0.059
*42 polonium.n.01 0.114 92 bug.n.01 0.058
43 wood.n.01 0.114 93 s.candy.n.01 0.058
*44 selenium.n.01 0.110 94 musician.n.01 0.057
45 soccer.n.01 0.110 95 summer.n.01 0.057
46 monetary_unit.n.01 0.109 96 s.dragon.n.01 0.057
47 s.child.n.01 0.106 97 s.kit.n.01 0.057
48 s.bear.v.01 0.106 98 dish.n.02 0.056
*49 en.n.01 0.103 99 s.ice.n.01 0.055
*50 mister.n.01 0.102 100 s.butterfly.n.01 0.055
Table 4.12: Most probable semantic categories in the RockYou list
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prehensive names dictionary, such as “li”, and “ho”, where it is likely no name was
intended. Other categories, noted with *, likely result from noise artifacts from
two letter words (e.g., polonium “Po” and multiple sclerosis “MS”). Of particular
interest is tellarium, coming from the word “te", which upon investigation of the
data set appears to tend to occur quite often in passwords containing the Spanish
phrase “te amo" (which means “i love you").
51




The hypothesis driving this dissertation is that passwords can be characterized by
semantic patterns, which can help us understand more about the effective security
provided by passwords in practice. In order to verify this hypothesis, the mere se-
mantic classification of the password segments is not enough. We need a model to
capture the structural relationships of semantic classes and encode the probabilities
of different constructs. The intuition behind the usefulness of semantic patterns is
that some words tend to pair up with specific classes of words. This occurs due
to selectional preferences that depend both on part-of-speech and meaning; for
example, a verb calls for a noun, and the verb eat is most probably followed by the
name of a food. From the security point of view, this may represent a significant
reduction in the search space in a cracking session, i.e., the guesser will only try or
prioritize guesses that are probable both in the semantic and in the syntactic levels.
Computational linguists have been representing those patterns through grammars;
however, we cannot assume that people follow the grammar of English in pass-
words, since they have no reason to do so; hence, the algorithm needs to learn
the passwords grammar. Following Weir et al. [2009], we employ probabilistic
context-free grammars to model the syntactic and semantic patterns of passwords.
With this model we can learn the semantic patterns from a sample and generate
passwords previously unseen. Then a suitable way to evaluate the fitness of our
model, i.e., how well passwords can be characterized by semantic patterns, is using
it to generate guesses for cracking attacks. The extent by which those attacks are
successful is at the same time an indicator of how well the patterns are captured
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by the model and evidence of their security implications.
5.1 Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars
A probabilistic context free grammar (PCFG) is a context free grammar whose pro-
ductions have associated probabilities. A PCFG represents a syntax, i.e., it shows
how words group together and relate to each other as heads and dependents, and
it is used either to parse or generate the sentences of a language [Manning and
Schütze, 1999]. PCFGs were used in passwords first by Weir et al. [2009] to learn
mangling patterns from the RockYou list and generate guesses in highest probabil-
ity order. Under the assumption that long passwords are likely to follow English
grammar rules, Rao et al. [2013] used a context-free grammar of English to gen-
erate guesses targeting long passwords.
A generic PCFG G consists of:
• A set of terminals, Σ = {w1, ..., wm}. This is the vocabulary of the grammar,
that forms the content of the sentences.
• A set of nonterminals, V = {N1, ..., Nn}, also known as variables, are the
syntact categories of the grammar.
• A start variable N1.
• A set of rules Ni → ζ j, where ζ j is a sequence of terminals and nonterminals
and represents the j th rule of Ni.
• A set of probabilities on rules, such that ∀i
∑
j P(Ni → ζ j) = 1.
In our PCFG, Σ is a set comprised by the source corpora and the learned gap
segments, and V is the set of semantic and syntactic categories. The rules are all
of the form Ni → wk, i.e., a nonterminal derives exactly one terminal, or N1 → ξ,
where ξ is a sequence of nonterminals.
Since we have syntactic and semantic categories, and both are relevant to char-
acterize patterns, we combine both types of categories to compose the nonterminal
set. For nouns and verbs semantically classified, we overload a nonterminal sym-
bol with both semantic and syntactic information; for example, in the nonterminal
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Rule Prob.
A N1→ [PP][love.v.01.VV0][PP][number] 0.33
B N1→ [PP][hate.v.01.VVD][PP][number] 0.33
C N1→ [sport.n.01][number] 0.33
D [PP]→ i 0.5
E [PP]→ you 0.25
F [PP]→ them 0.25
G [love.v.01.VV0]→ love 1
H [hate.v.01.VVD]→ hated 1
I [sport.n.01]→ football 1
J [number]→ 2 0.5
K [number]→ 3 0.5
Table 5.1: Sample grammar learned from the training set iloveyou, ihatedthem3,
football3
love.v.01.VVD we have the concatenation of a semantic (love.v.01) and a POS cate-
gory (VVD). This symbol should derive only the verbs categorized as love that are
inflected in the past tense. In this way, we increase the descriptive power of the
grammar.
Example 2. N1→ [pronoun][love.v.01.V V D][pronoun][number]
The rules and the corresponding probabilities can be learned from a pass-
word training set by a simple algorithm. Given a segmented password, its se-
mantic/syntactic structure constitutes the right-hand side of the rule. Example 2
shows the rule learned from the password ilovedyou2. The segments that carry a
semantic tag (nouns and verbs) lead to POS- and semantic-based symbols (love),
while all others lead to POS-based symbols (I and you). The probability of such
a rule is simply its relative frequency, given by P(rule) = Cr/Ct , where Cr is the
count of matching passwords and Ct is the total count of passwords. In the same
way, the algorithm can learn rules that generate the terminals and their probabil-
ities. In Table 5.1, we show an example PCFG learned from the set of passwords
{ilove you2, ihated them3, f oot bal l3}.
Consistent with the nomenclature adopted by Weir et al. [2009], we call the
structures derived from the start variable base structures, i.e., right-hand side of
all N1 rules. Table 5.2 lists the most probable base structures learned from the
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Table 5.2: 50 most probable base structures of the grammar trained with the Rock-
You list.
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MySpace attack
Base Terminal (%) Guessed Approx.
Approach structures Non-terminals Terminals Struct. passwords # of guesses ?
Semantic 1,861,821 12,410 4,045,458 1.3× 1086 91.76 4.8× 1011
Weir 78,126 166 3,554,133 1.8× 1073 60.83 8.2× 109
Brute force 91.76 3.2× 1043
(bounded by Semantic)
Table 5.3: Comparison between grammars generated by the semantic and Weir
approaches trained with the RockYou list, and a comparable brute force attack. ?
See Section 5.4.4 for description of approximation methods and brute force com-
parison.
RockYou list. A base structure after the rewriting of all its nonterminal symbols
is called a terminal structure, and it is effectively a password generated by the
grammar. The probability of a terminal structure is the product of the probability
of the base structure with the probability of all the rules required for its derivation.
For example, P(youlovethem2) = P(A)×P(E)×P(G)×P(F)×P(J) = 0.0103125.
Table 5.3 shows a comparison between the PCFGs generated by our approach and
the approach of Weir et al. [2009], both trained with the RockYou list.
5.2 Building a guess generator
Password cracking usually involves some software that can read or generate a
guess, hash it using the same hashing algorithm used by the target and compare
it against all the target hashes. The most prominent program is John the Ripper
(JtR) [Openwall]. When a comparison results true, we have a hit, i.e., a password
was successfully guessed. The popular approaches for generating the guesses are
either based on word lists or brute force. In the word list approach, the guesses
come from a large list of strings, or a compilation of lists. Word lists are man-
ually curated and available from a variety of sources on the web. They usually
contain strings that are highly used as passwords, and strings found in previous
leaks. The limitation of word lists is obvious: a password not listed there will not
be guessed. To overcome this limitation, John The Ripper comes with a mangling
option, where it reads a guess from the word list and derives variations based on
a configurable set of heuristics, e.g., password→ p4ssw0rd. In this case, a wordlist
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Algorithm 4 Generates guesses in highest probability order
1: procedure GENERATEGUESSES(G)
2: . Initialize priority queue with most probable derivation of each base
structure
3: queue← initialize priority queue
4: for all G.base_structures do
5: guess← initialize guess
6: guess.terminals← most probable terminal values for the base struct.
7: guess.pivot← 0





13: while c 6= NULL do . Generate password guesses
14: OUTPUT(c) . Output current guess
15: for i← c.pivot, LEN(c.terminals) do . Derive lower probability guesses
from the same base structure
16: new← initialize new guess
17: new.terminals← DECREMENT(c.terminals, G, i) . Replace
c.terminals[i] by the next lower probability terminal at i
18: if new.terminals 6= NULL then









of a couple of million entries can generate dozens of millions of guesses. In the
brute force strategy, an algorithm progressively generates all possible strings up to
a maximum length. In addition, JtR features a “smart brute force” mode, where
it uses a Markov model to prioritize the generation of guesses containing more
frequent letters.
In a realistic cracking session, crackers first exhaust the possibilities of the word
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list mode and then switch to a brute force attack, which cracks passwords in a much
lower hits/guesses ratio. This strategy can potentially crack the most common
passwords fast, but will take a long time to guess all the passwords; so the larger
the number of passwords cracked before switching to the brute force mode, the
better (for the attacker). As previously mentioned, Weir et al. [2009] used PCFGs
to learn mangling rules and generate guesses in optimal probability order. Their
approach shows good results when the training set is very similar to the target. As
we will see in Section 5.4, when the password creation policy of the target is differ-
ent, affecting the choice of mangling rules, their method degenerates quickly. We
hypothesize that using the same PCFG framework, but learning semantic patterns
in addition to mangling rules, will be more accurate in generating realistic guesses.
Once we have the grammar trained, building a guess generator is just a matter
of outputting the terminal structures in highest probability order. This said, the
algorithm for this job is not exactly trivial. Fortunately, Weir et al. [2009] proposed
Algorithm 4, which works well for this purpose. Our PCFG is able to generate an
enormous number of guesses (1.3× 1086) when trained on RockYou. For the sake
of comparison, the approach of Weir et al. [2009] (hereafter referred to as the Weir
approach, for convenience) trained on the same RockYou list and using dic-0294
as the input dictionary can generate around 1.8× 1073 guesses.
5.2.1 Custom Mangling
The semantic guess generator only generates guesses containing lowercase word
segments; gap segments, instead, are learned (and derived) in the form they ap-
pear in the passwords. Case mangling of word segments, however, is a desirable
feature, since it is a common mangling pattern. Table 5.4 shows the case statis-
tics for the word segments we extracted from the RockYou passwords, where the
mangled category corresponds to words that do not fall in any other category, e.g.,
hOUse. Even though lowercase guesses would not be a high limiting factor against
RockYou, it would probably severely limit the guessing success of our generator
against targets that enforce strong password creation policies. Thus, we developed
a version of the guess generator that applies a small set of custom mangling rules
to word segments. Gap segments always preserve their original case.
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Table 5.4: Case statistics of word segments extracted from RockYou passwords.
Capital Capitalizes the first word segment, e.g., bearDOG123LoL→ Beardog123LoL.
This rule is only applied to guesses that begin with a word segment, i.e.,
words derived from all non-terminal symbols, except mixed_all, mixed_num_sc,
number, special and char.
Uppercase Uppercases all characters of word segments, e.g., bearDOG123LoL →
BEARDOG123LoL.
Camel Case Capitalizes all word segments, e.g., bearDOG123LoL→ BearDog123LoL.
It is worth highlighting the sophistication of the camel case rule, which is only
possible with password segmentation, a feature not present in the state-of-the-art
password crackers.
5.3 Comparison with previous approach
Our approach can be seen as an evolution of the Weir approach. Before present-
ing the experiments that show to what extent the semantic approach outperfoms
the state-of-the-art techniques, in this section we enumerate the points where our
technique deviates from the Weir approach.
5.3.0.1 Base Structures
The Weir approach uses only a small set of non-terminal symbols: Dn (digits), Sn
(special characters) and Ln (alphabetic strings), where n is the string length. As
seen in Table 5.3, our method trained on the RockYou list generates a much finer
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grained grammar, with 12,410 non-terminal symbols, in comparison with the 166
non-terminals generated by the Weir approach trained on the same list. This leads
to more precise probability estimates.
5.3.1 Terminals
As opposed to our method, the Weir approach does not include rules to derive
alphabetic strings, i.e., it does not “learn” them. Their method takes a dictionary
as input and estimates the probability of a word w of length n as the relative
frequency 1/Cn, where Cn is the count of words of length n. Since the number
of distinct short words is reduced (e.g., ar gmax(C1) = 26), this strategy tends to
favour guesses containing short alphabetic strings.
5.3.2 Input
The Weir guessing algorithm takes two parameters as input, a grammar and an
input dictionary. In our method, the “input dictionary” (equivalent to Terminals in
Table 5.3) is embedded in the grammar. While this provides the already mentioned
advantages, it impacts on flexibility. If we want to use a different set of terminals
(e.g., COCA unigrams or a foreign language corpus), rules need to be created link-
ing them to the non-terminals (semantic and syntactic categories), which requires
re-running the semantic classifier.
5.4 Experiments
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
We use the community enhanced version (bleeding jumbo) of John The Ripper
1.8 [Magnumripper]. This software has a so-called stdin mode, where it receives
guesses from a third-party program through the standard input. This mode al-
lows us to pipe the guesses from the guess generators to JtR, which performs the
hash comparisons. With a small script, JtR’s output is parsed and the graphs are
generated.
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In the experiments, performed in a desktop computer with processor Intel Core
i5 CPU 650 @ 3.20GHz × 4 and 8GB RAM, we limit the number of guesses to
3 billion (due only to memory limitations) and, despite the fact that the target
passwords might have known minimum length, we do not filter the guesses, in
order to test the methods with no assumptions about the target.
The methods tested are:
1. Semantic approach without mangling rules
2. Semantic approach with custom mangling rules
3. Semantic approach with default JtR’s mangling rules
4. Weir approach
5. Wordlist with JtR’s default rules, followed by incremental mode1
In method 1 the strings are used as generated by our grammar (lowercased),
while in method 2 case mangling is applied as described in Section 5.2.1 and in
method 3 JtR’s default mangling rules are applied. Method 4 uses the strings gen-
erated by the software that Weir made available on his personal website [Weir],
trained on the same dataset as the semantic approaches (RockYou), and with the
input dictionary used in their article (dic-0294). In method 5, we use JtR’s wordlist
mode with the passwords.txt wordlist (2,151,220 unique values) available at Daz-
zlepod [Dazzlepod]. According to Dazzlepod, this list has a success rate of 40%
using JtR’s mangling rules against the Lulzsec collection of hashes (final release).
The primary criterion for the choice of the experimental scenarios is the rele-
vance of the targets, i.e., we focus on large leaks from popular services that gath-
ered major attention and concern of the media. We also consider possible sources
of bias, namely, the type of resource being protected, the demographics of users,
and the collection method [Jakobsson and Dhiman, 2013].
5.4.2 Experiment 1: Using RockYou Semantics to Guess LinkedIn
In this scenario, the grammars are trained with RockYou, and the target is the
LinkedIn list, which was exposed in June 2012. The LinkedIn list contains 5,787,239
unique passwords hashed with unsalted SHA-1, including hashes whose first 5 dig-
1Incremental mode in JtR corresponds to the brute force attack enhanced with Markov proba-
bilities.
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Figure 5.1: Results of Experiment 1. The three variations of the semantic approach
perform better than the competing approaches.
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Figure 5.2: Results of Experiment 2. The best semantic condition guesses approx-
imately 32% more passwords than the Weir approach.
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its are zeroed; hence, the hash comparison is adapted by passing the parameter
--format=raw-sha1-linkedin to JtR. Note that because the LinkedIn list only con-
tains unique hashes, the reported cracking rates do not account for the effect of
commonly used passwords. Among the passwords, there are some which are com-
posed of only alphabetic lowercase characters, so we believe the password creation
policy was either non-existent or fairly liberal. This leak is relatively free of bias,
as the users are predominantly adults with some degree of education and the pass-
words were somehow stolen (as opposed to phishing). The type of resource being
protected (social network profiles), however, is not of the highest risk to personal
privacy.
The results show that the semantic approach in all 3 variations outperforms
the competing methods (Figure 5.1). The version with custom mangling rules sur-
passes the version without rules after the 500 millionth guess, probably due to the
fact that the target contains passwords with a variety of case configurations. The
semantic approach with JtR’s default rules is the worst among the three seman-
tic variations. A reasonable explanation for this is that most JtR’s mangling rules
change the guess structure in some way (e.g., reversing the characters, appending
numbers, etc.), violating the highest probability order of the guesses. The Weir ap-
proach is in fact the worst, with our approach cracking approximately 67% more
passwords than it. This is probably a consequence of it being trained on a list that
is not very similar to the target (demographics, type of resource being protected
and password creation rules are different). This highlights the robustness of our
method: it performs well even when trained with a list that has different character-
istics compared to the target. Moreover, our approach cracks 44% more passwords
than the Wordlist plus incremental method, which represents the industry stan-
dard.
5.4.3 Experiment 2: Using RockYou Semantics to Guess MyS-
pace
In this experiment, we target the MySpace list, one of the first large leaks, ex-
posed in 2006 and collected through phishing. This list is much smaller than the
LinkedIn list, containing 49,655 clear text passwords (41,543 unique). In order to
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keep the consistency with the other experiment, we encoded the passwords with
JtR’s dummy format—hexadecimal prefixed with “$dummy$”—and used the same
experimental setup as Experiment 1.
Again, the semantic approach outperforms all the others; in particular, it cracks
approximately 32% more passwords than the Weir approach. Because it was ob-
tained through phishing, the MySpace list is arguably composed of weaker pass-
words. This can be noticed by the fact that the non-mangled version of our algo-
rithm performs better than the version with custom mangling, probably because
the proportion of passwords using uppercase characters is not high.
5.4.4 Experiment 3: Final Guessing Success Rate against MyS-
pace
To evaluate the expressiveness of our model, it is necessary to know how many
passwords it would eventually guess, i.e., the final guessing success rate; how-
ever, it is known that our approach (as well as the Weir approach) can generate a
very large number of guesses. Finding the final guessing success rate empirically
is, thus, not viable in a reasonable amount of time without powerful computing
resources. Yet, it is possible to compute this measure with a simple grammar rec-
ognizer, with the constraint that the target passwords should be cleartext. If the
grammar recognizes a string, it is guaranteed that the string will be generated,
given enough time. To compare the semantic and Weir approaches, we built rec-
ognizers for both grammars trained with RockYou and ran them over the MySpace
passwords (cleartext). The results, presented in Table 5.3 prove the expressive-
ness of our model and its superiority in comparison with the Weir approach, which
eventually guesses around 30% less MySpace passwords.
Given that our grammar can recognize 91.76% passwords, it is important to
know how long it would take to achieve this success rate. We can obtain an esti-
mate of this measure by fitting a nonlinear regression model to a relatively small
sample of the guess probabilities. Figure 5.3 shows a sample of the first 600 mil-
lion guesses, reduced to every 10 millionth guess. The blue curve represents an
exponential decay model (Equation 5.1) with the β parameters fitted to the data
using the Gauss-Newton method. With the inverse function g(y) we can estimate
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Figure 5.3: Nonlinear regression model of the guess probabilities of the semantic
approach.
the guess index x corresponding to a certain probability. As output by our gram-
mar recognizer, the least probable password in the MySpace list is s6a6t6a6n6i6c,
with p = 2.8× 10−27. This probability is the ultimate lower bound of the semantic
cracking session and can be used as a parameter to g(y). This gives us the approx-
imate number of guesses for the semantic grammar in Table 5.3. Likewise, we can
determine the approximate number of guesses of a cracking session using the Weir
grammar. Table 5.3 portrays a comparison between the number of guesses of the
semantic and Weir approaches, as well as of a brute force attack that would guess
91.76% passwords as a baseline. The brute force attack is simulated by calculating
the number of possible guesses needed to cover the search space defined by all
strings with length up to 19 characters, which is the longest string guessed by the
semantic approach. In this way, we estimate how many guesses are necessary for
the brute force attack to achieve the same success rate of the semantic approach.
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5.5 Performance Limitations
In comparison with JtR’s modes and the Weir approach, our approach is inferior
in terms of time (guesses/second) and memory consumption. The following table
shows the average number of guesses per second of each approach, as measured
in Experiment 1, against SHA-1 hashes:
Approach Guesses/s
JtR Wordlist + Incremental 6,172,839
Weir 963,081
Semantic 208,333
Table 5.5: Average guesses/s against SHA-1 hashes.
In fact, we use the same algorithm as the Weir approach to generate guesses,
but our grammar contains many more base structures (see Table 5.3).
Further study is needed to detect whether the performance bottleneck is in
the complexity of the algorithm or the problem can be solved by optimizing the
implementation. Despite that, as presented in the previous section, the semantic
approach can be more efficient than the other approaches, as measured using an
implementation- and platform-agnostic metric, namely, success rate (hits/guesses).
Notably, the inferior performance can be neglected in cracking sessions against
slow hashes, such as bcrypt, where the hashing time is the bottleneck, turning the
cost of hash comparisons much higher. Table 5.6 shows an empirical assessment of
how many hash comparisons (guesses) per second are possible against the hashing
functions SHA-1, sha512crypt and bcrypt with a variety of hardware and state-
of-the-art software. Whereas about 98× 106 hash comparisons can be performed
with a standard desktop computer against SHA-1, only around 4960 comparisons
can be performed against bcrypt in the same conditions. In the latter scenario, the
semantic approach would achieve better results than the competing approaches,
since it can generate more accurate guesses.
As a workaround to the high memory consumption of our implementation, we
introduced a probability threshold to limit the number of guesses added to the
priority queue. We use the regression model outlined in the previous section to
estimate the lower probability bound of a larger cracking session. This estimate
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Algorithm Iterations Software Hardware Guesses/s
SHA-1 1 JtR 1.7.9-jumbo6 Intel Core i7 990X 98× 106
SHA-1 1 oclHashcat plus-0.09 4x AMD Radeon HD 6990 155× 108
sha512crypt 5000 JtR 1.7.9-jumbo6 Intel Core i7 990X 1800
sha512crypt 5000 JtR 1.7.9-jumbo6 ATI Radeon HD 5870 2592
sha512crypt 5000 JtR 1.7.9-jumbo6 Nvidia GTX 580 11405
bcrypt 32 JtR 1.7.9-jumbo6 Intel Core i7 990X 4960
bcrypt 32 JtR 1.7.9-jumbo6 ATI Radeon HD 5870 1745
Table 5.6: Speed of SHA-1 vs. Modern Password Hashing Algorithms [Gosney,
2012]
can be used as the probability threshold value, allowing guesses that would not
be output to be discarded, freeing memory. This workaround is used in our exper-
iments, where we predict the probability of the 3-billionth guess and use it as a
threshold for the guess generation. In this way, the same amount of memory pre-
viously enough to perform only 600 million guesses becomes sufficient to generate
around 3 billion. We verified that the probability of this 3-billionth guess was very
close to that predicted by the regression model.
Another issue that might be hindering the performance and efficiency of our
approach is that our grammar generates duplicates guesses. This occurs because
passwords are ambiguous, being possibly generated by different base structures.
For example, the password onego, can be generated by base structures producing
(on, ego) or (one, go). Further study is needed to measure the impact of this issue





In this dissertation we have contributed with the first framework for the analysis
of semantics in passwords and approaches for guessing passwords more efficiently
than the existing ones.
We began by demonstrating how one can analyse date patterns in a passwords
sample, in Chapter 3. Then we enumerated the relevant date patterns in the largest
real-world password list ever released and indicated the potential vulnerabilities
caused by their occurrence through realistic guessing attack simulations. To our
knowledge, this is the first systematic exploration of date patterns in passwords. In
Chapter 4, we applied Natural Language Processing methods to the segmentation
and classification of password samples. With such methods, we decomposed pass-
words into conceptually consistent parts and inferred their meaning and syntactic
function. The computer-supported semantic classification of passwords is an un-
precedented application of NLP. Furthermore, we are the first to demonstrate how
a computational linguistic model can be used to generalize semantic categories
from a password sample based on its semantic profile.
Lastly, and more importantly, in Chapter 5 we extended the state-of-the-art
model of password patterns and created a model that encapsulates the semantic
and syntactic patterns of passwords. With a set of experiments, we informed the
impact of semantic patterns on the security provided by passwords and evaluated
the expressiveness of our model against the state-of-the-art approach. The experi-
mental results evidence that our model captures password creation patterns better
than any previous model. Besides, they strongly support our hypothesis that se-
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mantic patterns represent a serious vulnerability for the password authentication
scheme.
6.1 Summary of Results
Our research has achieved quantitative results that have practical value to the se-
curity community, being potentially informative to studies on password patterns
and creation policies. In the following sections we synthesize the main results.
6.1.1 Date Patterns
Our visualization enabled discovery of a number of semantic patterns in the Rock-
You list: (a) years after 1969; (b) text words that spell out the name of a month; (c)
sequences of two years; (d) the first day in each month; (e) repeated months/days
and (f) holidays.
These semantic patterns have security implications—most notably, they enable
the creation of language-independent password guessing dictionaries, which re-
quire no a-priori knowledge of the users. These dictionaries could be successful
in an offline attack or against systems that do not implement account lock-out
policies. We created one dictionary of approximately 15,000 popular dates that
guessed approximately 1% of passwords from the RockYou dataset. We also found
that approximately 4% of RockYou passwords were purely numeric dates, which
can be guessed in a dictionary of approximately 200,000 entries. Finally, we found
that over 4.5% of RockYou passwords can be characterized as dates (either purely
numeric dates or dates that spell out the name of the month).
Our findings suggest it would be prudent to recommend that users do not
choose a pure date numeric sequence as their password. Our findings also strongly
suggest the presence of certain patterns in user choice of dates. These patterns




6.1.2 General Semantic Patterns
We performed a comparison at the lexical and syntactic level between the lan-
guage used in the RockYou passwords and the natural language, represented by
the British National Corpus. The results showed that a large number of short words
are much more likely to appear in natural language than in passwords, including
prepositions and conjunctions. However, other syntactic classes that also contain
predominantly short words, such as pronouns, are significantly more likely to ap-
pear in passwords. We also showed that some differences in word frequency are
probably result of semantic preferences. Those findings call for a more in-depth
investigation from the cultural and linguistic perspectives.
We found that a semantic model trained with a large password list, can be used
in a guessing attack to crack up to 67% more passwords than the approach of Weir
et al. [2009], and up to 44% more passwords than the de facto industry standard
(a combination of wordlist and brute force strategies), given the same number of
guesses. Those numbers refer to the passwords stolen from LinkedIn, a website
currently ranked #14 globally [Alexa]. We also found that our semantic model
can ultimately crack, given an unlimited number of guesses, approximately 30%
more passwords from the MySpace leak than the approach of Weir et al. [2009],
and 32% more within a 3 billion guesses constraint.
In summary, the semantic approach can crack passwords at a higher hits/guesses
ratio, giving to an attacker a significant economy of time during cracking sessions
against targets hashed with slows algorithms. This represents a serious security
vulnerability, as efficiency is critical in a situation where passwords have been
stolen and the cracker is trying to guess them before they are reset.
The semantic patterns discovered also provide insight into the passwords that
people tend to choose. For example, we have found that many passwords contain
concepts relating to love, sexual terms, profanity, animals, alcohol, and money.
When the term “love" is used, it is most often in the context of “i love X", where X
is either an objective personal pronoun (e.g., you, me, him, her) or a male name.




Our research into the semantic patterns in passwords has raised several opportu-
nities for future research. In this section, we discuss these under three thematic
directions: improvements to the semantic approach, proactive password checking,
and anthropological analysis.
6.2.1 Semantic based guessing
As described in Chapter 5, the performance of our guess generator currently pre-
vents us from running larger experiments on a standard desktop computer. As
future work, we plan to run larger experiments on a High Performance Comput-
ing (HPC) platform. This will allow us to detect when the success curve begins to
flatten out, which will give us a better understanding of the practical limitations of
our approach.
While our experimental scenarios are surely relevant, there are other interest-
ing experiments we would like to perform. In particular, training our grammar
with smaller password samples would serve to test if the semantics learned from
small samples are capable of compromising the same targets. In this respect, we
expect that the generalization of semantic categories compensate, to some extent,
the reduced sample size.
We are currently not exploring the full potential of semantic generalization. By
generalizing concepts, we can generate guesses containing words not seen in the
training data. However, as the vocabulary of our grammar is learned from the
training data, we do not generate guesses containing new words. We plan to aug-
ment our semantic approach by adding words from the WordNet-derived semantic
categories which were unseen in training data. A challenge in this scenario is es-
timating the probabilities of the unseen words. One approach would be to assign
discounted probabilities to unseen words based on their distribution in a natural
language corpus such as COCA.
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6.2.2 Proactive Password Checking
We suggest that the semantic grammar we built could be used for proactive pass-
word checking [Bishop and Klein, 1995]. A proactive password checker could use
the PCFG to determine a password’s probability, and if highly probable, it could
warn the user or reject the password. Our grammar could also be used for pass-
word strength meters and suggesting password modifications as has been proposed
with structural grammars Houshmand and Aggarwal [2012]. A challenge in incor-
porating these technologies is determining what the resulting effect is on usability
and whether new password patterns emerge. User studies are required to deter-
mine the feasibility of such proactive approaches in practice.
6.2.3 Anthropological Analysis
Passwords are an interesting source for cultural studies [Andrews, 2012; Bonneau,
2010]. Their secret nature is a kind of guarantee for people that whatever they
write in a password will remain private. The fact that passwords are typed sev-
eral times a day [Florencio and Herley, 2007] reminds people that any thoughts
expressed through them will be brought up often. In systems where changing
passwords periodically is mandatory, the passwords are constantly acquiring new
contents, which might well be influenced by cultural trends.
When tagged semantically, a list of passwords can be seen as a repository of
thoughts with varying sentiments. Given that passwords contain people’s names,
company names, feelings, actions, etc., answers to questions such as “Is feeling A
more frequent than B?” or “Which political view is more predominant?” can po-
tentially feed much discussion and hypotheses. Therefore, we envision that the
semantic patterns of passwords would make a rich source for anthropological in-
vestigation. In order to support this direction, the incorporation of sentiment anal-
ysis is likely required; moreover, a visualization interface would be ideal to support
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